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2 
I Introduction 
 
‘Russia and Moldova: The next Bosnia?’, asked The Economist in June 1992 expressing 
the widespread fear at the time that clashes between regular Moldovan forces and 
Russian and Ukrainian separatists of Moldova’s Transnistria region might push the new 
Moldovan Republic towards the brink of an all-out civil war. However, the following 15 
years have shown that Moldova has not followed Bosnia and other ex-Yugoslav republics 
down the road of armed conflict and ethnic hatred that have led to human suffering 
unknown in Europe since the days of the Second World War. The Moldovan crisis has 
turned rather into what is often called a ‘frozen conflict’ between the Moldovan central 
state and a quasi-independent Transnistrian statelet, situated between the official 
Ukraine-Moldova border and the river Dnjestr. 
This ‘frozen conflict’ situation has created a number of complex and mutually reinforcing 
security problems in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU): first, the 
flourishing of organized crime and weapons proliferation; secondly, the presence of 
former Soviet and now Russian troops and armament on Transnistrian soil – a fact that 
the Kremlin defends with the unresolved conflict there; and thirdly, the general weakness 
of the Moldovan state due to the unresolved conflict. Most of these issues have also been 
identified as ‘key threats’ by the EU in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS).1 
Moldova has, thus, turned into an important test case for the EU’s growing foreign policy 
in general and its new neighbourhood policy in particular. At the same time, from an 
analytical point of view, it has become a useful case study to examine how the EU deals 
with security challenges in its neighbourhood. 
As a foreign policy actor, the EU has been dominantly characterized as a rather benign, 
postmodern polity with a strong focus on persuasion and soft power rather than on 
coercion and hard power. These approaches, most notably the ‘civilian power Europe’ 
concept and its derivates, have largely focused on either the goals and available means or, 
more recently, on the norms of the EU itself. They have neglected, however, the 
increasingly apparent fact that the EU deals differently with distinct issues. For instance, 
the EU has a different behaviour in matters related to energy security than in certain 
fields of its human rights agenda. In other words, the EU cannot be characterized as a 
single-type actor. The central question regarding the EU as a foreign policy actor is 
rather: In which situation acts the EU in which way? It will be argued in this piece that – 
depending on the issue – the EU acts either as a security provider or as a security 
consumer. The analysis of conflict management, one of the EU’s major foreign policy 
objectives, and in particular of conflict management in Moldova, will serve in this respect 
as the empirical base that will underpin this argument. In short, it will be examined in 
how far the EU acts as a security provider or as a security consumer in the case of 
conflict management in Moldova. 
The structure of the paper is threefold: first, we will deepen the conceptual basis of the 
security provider/security consumer approach. Afterwards, we will examine, first, the 
existing security challenges in Moldova and, secondly, how the EU has dealt with them – 
both on a rhetoric and a practical level. The analysis shall include both European 
Commission policies and actions in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security 
                                                 
1 See A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 3-
5. 
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Policy (CFSP). Finally, we will argue in the conclusions that the EU has turned from a 
passive security consumer into an emerging security provider in the case of conflict 
management in Moldova. However, in the future, the EU may turn once more into a 
security consumer, as the EU may give in to Russian pressure and may avoid any 
security-related changes of the status quo in the secessionist entities in its neighbourhood, 
including Transnistria. In other words, the postmodern EU with its interests in 
transformation and sustainable conflict settlement may be restrained in its efforts by the 
status quo interests of Russia acting as a traditional power. 
 
 
II Tensions in European Foreign Policy 
 
Ever since it has become apparent that the EU is an external actor in its own right, 
academics have tried to define the EU’s foreign policy characteristics – a particularly 
difficult endeavour, since the EU is neither a state nor a classical international 
organization. The dominant approaches have in common that they stress – at least tacitly 
– the EU’s lack of military power and, at the same time, its strong civilian and/or soft 
means such as its economic power or its capacity to shape international norms. In other 
words, the EU has been largely depicted as a civilian or, more recently, as a normative 
power.2  
However, with the development of the EU’s military capacities in the framework of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and with the actual deployment of EU 
military missions abroad these traditional approaches have come under increasing 
scrutiny. Especially the concept of normative power has been at the centre of a lively 
debate on the conceptualization of the EU as a special kind of actor in international 
affairs, though most authors do not rule out completely the (refined) idea of a normative 
or civilian power Europe.3 Many warn, however, of the negative effects of the EU’s 
‘militarization’ on a normative or civilian power Europe.4 In fact, it is questionable in 
how far the EU can still be termed a civilian or normative power, when the EU and its 
Member States may have up to 60,000 soldiers on military missions ranging from central 
Africa to East Asia.5 However, at the same time the EU is not turning into a classical 
military or great power either. The idea of the EU as a military power-in-the-making, 
which will challenge one day the role of the United States as the sole superpower, is at 
least in the mid-term not realistic. The EU simply lacks the necessary resources, 
capabilities and, most notably, the political will. But if the EU is neither a pure civilian or 
normative nor an emerging military power, which kind of actor is it then? Some authors 
such as Gnesotto argue that the EU is simply a ‘sui generis power’, which is developing a 
                                                 
2 See F. Duchêne, ‘Europe in World Peace’ in R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look 
ahead (Fontana, London 1972), pp. 32-49; and I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in 
Terms?’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 235-258. 
3 ‘What kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public 
Policy (special issue ed. by H. Sjursen).  
4 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’ (2006) 13 Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 182-199. 
5 See B. Giegerich and W. Wallace, ‘Not such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces’ 
(2004) 46 Survival, pp. 163-182. 
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specifically European strategy for external action.6 Yet, this concept simply points out 
that the EU is an actor distinct from other actors in the international system, but does not 
say which type of actor it actually is. Moreover, it does not remove the major problem all 
the previous concepts of the EU as an international actor have in common: the EU is seen 
as single type of actor. 
A close look at the EU’s actions reveals actually that though in some issues the 
characterisation of the EU as a civilian or normative power may be adequate, e.g. in the 
international efforts against the death penalty, in others it is rather questionable, for 
example regarding minority protection.7 This problem is the result of an overly focus of 
the traditional approaches on what the EU is in general and, especially in the case of the 
civilian power concept, on the specific goals and means of the EU as such instead of the 
actual behaviour of the EU in certain foreign policy areas. In short, traditional 
characterisations of the EU do not sufficiently recognize that the EU acts in certain areas 
in one way and in others in another way. Consequently, they also fail to discern the 
emerging tension between distinct foreign policy approaches within the EU. 
This tension within the EU’s foreign policy, however, is already reflected in various 
studies. Dannreuther, in an analysis of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, defends for 
example the idea that the EU’s actions which are carried out according to the EU’s 
interests in transformation are ‘counterbalanced’ by its status quo interests.8A 
comprehensive characterisation of the EU as an international actor has to take into 
consideration these tensions within the EU’s foreign policy. In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to stir the analysis of the EU as an international actor away from the focus on 
either norms or goals and means of the EU per se and to refocus the research on the EU’s 
interests and actions in specific foreign policy areas. In this way, it is possible to translate 
the tension within EU foreign policy into a dual characterisation of the EU as an 
international actor. 
The model that is proposed in this article is based on the idea that in some instances the 
EU acts as a security provider and in others as a security consumer.9 The basic difference 
between a security provider and a security consumer depends on the relative balance 
between what an actor gains and what it gives.10 In terms of interests and actions, a 
security provider has a stronger interest in the immediate security of a third party rather 
than in direct security gains for itself. Nevertheless, a security provider is also interested 
in its own security improvements. The prospect of own security gains – often rather 
indirect and in the long-term – are even a significant incentive for security providers to 
                                                 
6 N. Gnesotto, ‘Editorial: European Strategy as a Model’ [2004] 9 Newsletter (Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris), pp. 1 and 4. 
7 See M. Lerch and G. Schwellnus, ‘Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the EU’s 
External Human Rights Policy’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 304-321. They actually 
argue that the EU’s normative power depends heavily on the interaction between its policy goals, means 
and justifications, and therefore varies between different issue areas. 
8 R. Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’ 
(2006) 11 EFA Rev, pp. 194-198. 
9 See E. Barbé, Defining Security in the Wider Europe Policy: A Critical Assessment (unpublished, paper 
presented at the CHALLENGE Conference “Internal Freedom versus External Security? Assessing EU 
Policy in JHA and CFSP”), 2005. 
10 See K. Longhurst, ‘From Security Consumer to Security Provider – Poland and Transatlantic Security in 
the Twenty-First Century’, (2002) 2 Defence Studies, pp. 51-52. Longhurst herself refers to state actors. 
Nevertheless, her categorization is also useful for the EU. 
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act, which is why the action of a security provider easily lead to a win-win situation, 
where both the third party and the security provider gain in security. It is also possible to 
argue that a security provider is interested in absolute gains. Its own security interests, 
however, are only secondary. A security consumer, on the other hand, is primarily 
interested in its own security and is largely indistinct towards the security needs of third 
parties. A security consumer is, therefore, an international actor that acts only if its own 
security interests are affected. A special case of the security consumer would be an actor 
that does not act at all, even though the security interests of another actor are clearly at 
stake, and that expects other actors to deal with the security issues in question. Such an 
actor can be called a passive security consumer. In general, security consumers create 
easily win-lose situations, in which the third party is usually on the losing side. 
Although in practice it is not always easy to distinguish between a security provider and a 
security consumer approach and specific approaches may change over time with the 
development of policies, it can be argued that in some clear cases the EU can be 
characterized as either a security provider or security consumer. For example, in the case 
of some Justice and Home Affairs policies such as migration from neighbouring 
countries, the EU acts largely as a security consumer, i.e. it intends to gain security 
against the massive migration flows from neighbouring countries without taking 
sufficiently into consideration the interests of the neighbouring countries or the migrants 
themselves. Migration has become indeed a (perceived) security problem of the EU11 and 
the dominant approach has been to externalize the EU’s migration control instruments 
such as border controls in transit countries or readmission agreements with sending 
countries.  
Although at first sight the EU seems to act dominantly as a security consumer, there are 
also arguably cases of the EU being a security provider. For example, it can be argued 
that the active promotion by the EU of democracy and human rights in third countries 
provides more security for the citizens in these countries than the EU or its citizens gain 
themselves. This is not to say that European democracy and human rights promotion 
policies are effective. On the contrary, they generally suffer from the lack of efficiency, 
consistency and resources.12 Nevertheless, the EU’s democracy and human rights 
promotion policy as such can still qualify as a security provider policy, especially in the 
realm of the Commission. Conceptually, the EU seems to show in this particular context 
a special preoccupation for human security, defined by the Barcelona Report as 
‘individual freedom from basic insecurities’.13 Yet, some authors have warned about the 
current danger of the EU turning from human security towards humanitarian intervention, 
leaving aside development policies and focusing on short-term military instruments.14 
As the examples of the EU acting as a security provider and security consumer 
demonstrate, both approaches coexist, thus creating a constant tension between the two 
within EU foreign policy. In the case of conflict management, the ESS, the EU’s major 
                                                 
11 See J. Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, pp. 751-777. 
12 See R. Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006 (FRIDE, Madrid 
2006), pp. 51-80. 
13 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities, in M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds), A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, 
Principles, Practicalities (Routledge, London 2006), p. 330. 
14 See I. Manners, note 4 above, p. 192. 
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strategic document in this field in the absence of a fully-fledged strategy for conflict 
management, suggests that in general the EU intends to be a security provider: First, the 
EU’s security interests in regional conflicts are primarily concerned with the security of 
third parties, in particular of individuals and minorities, and are linked only indirectly to 
the security of the EU, its Member States and citizens: ‘Violent or frozen conflicts, which 
also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and 
social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and 
human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides 
opportunities for organized crime’.15 Secondly, it proposes a wide range of conflict 
management measures, including both civilian and military instruments.16 However, in 
practice only the detailed analysis of security interests and actions (or inactions) in 
concrete case studies can determine in how far the EU has acted over time as either a 
security provider or a security consumer. 
 
 
III The EU and the Security Challenges in Moldova 
 
Unlike in many other conflicts, the security challenges in Moldova are not directly related 
to the existence of an armed conflict, neither in the form of an all-out civil war nor in the 
form of a low-intensity conflict or terrorism. The main problem is rather that a relatively 
short civil war in 1992 has not been ended by a comprehensive conflict settlement, but by 
a stalemate between the Moldovan central state and the Transnistrian separatists, who 
have been able to establish their own quasi-state. The conflict has resisted stubbornly all 
international mediation efforts for more than a decade.17 This situation gave rise to at 
least three interrelated security challenges: First, criminal networks have been able to 
establish a flourishing shadow economy based on the smuggling and trafficking of 
alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, weapons and human beings with Transnistria as both a transit 
route between Asia and Europe and a ‘safe haven for criminals’.18 Secondly, Russia has 
refused so far to withdraw its ‘peacekeeping’ forces from Transnistria, which further 
complicates the conflict, since the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria is not 
welcomed by Moldova. Moreover, Russian weapons and ammunition may fall into the 
wrong hands, for example of criminal networks. Thirdly, the conflict has been a crucial 
stumbling block of the strengthening of Moldova in general. Moldova is in fact an 
extremely weak state, with a fragile state structure, poor economic performance and few 
public services for its citizens. 
In the first decade after the 1992 civil war, these and other security-related issues were 
largely absent from EU-Moldova relations. Most notably, the 1994 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, the framework agreement for EU-Moldova relations, is 
basically a trade agreement with some cooperation aspects and does not have an explicit 
                                                 
15 European Security Strategy, note 1 above, p. 4. 
16 See European Security Strategy, note 1 above, p. 7. 
17 For an overview of the Transnistrian conflict and the various issues involved, see Moldova’s Uncertain 
Future (Europe Report 175, International Crisis Group 2006), available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org>; 
and M. Vahl and M. Emerson, ‘Chapter 4: Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict’ (2004) 1 Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, available at: <http://www.ecmi.de/jemie >. 
18 Moldova: No Quick Fix, (Europe Report 147, International Crisis Group 2003), available at: 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org>. 
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security dimension, not even in relation with the Transnistrian conflict. This lack of 
interest for Moldova’s security problems indicates that during this time, the EU may have 
been a passive security consumer. The year 2002, however, can be seen as a turning point 
in EU-Moldova relations, in particular in security matters. Since then, the Transnistria 
conflict and its associated security threats have adopted slowly but steadily a more 
prominent role in the EU’s external relations. Although this role has never become 
dominant and all relevant EU documents reveal serious shortcomings in relation with the 
security issues involved in the case of Moldova,19 the way the security problems have 
been presented indicate that the EU has been directly interested in the security of 
Moldova and its citizens and that it might qualify as a security provider. At the same 
time, the EU has been also driven by its own interest in a stable and prosperous 
neighbourhood in the prospect of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, which have 
finally led to a common EU-Moldova border. More concretely, the EU’s stronger interest 
in Moldovan security issues coincides with the beginnings of the new European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) around 2001/2002, which aims at establishing a zone of 
stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood. 
On 27 December 2001 the Commission published for the first time a major strategic 
document related with Moldova – the Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, which was 
later updated by another Country Strategy Paper.20 This document focuses principally on 
Moldova as a weak state and analyses in detail the numerous political, social and 
economic problems of the country. At the same time, the Transnistria conflict and the 
related problems of organized crime and Russian military presence are examined. The 
Transnistria conflict is indeed clearly identified as a fundamental problem for Moldova: 
‘The Transdniestrian dispute heavily affects Moldova’s foreign relations and economic 
development. Moldova can only make limited progress towards democratic consolidation 
and economic improvements as long as the Transdniestrian issue continues’.21 The 
documents about Moldova that the Commission has presented afterwards follow quite 
similar patterns in relation with the Transnistria conflict, especially the Country Report 
Moldova, published on 12 May 2004, and the EU/Moldova Action Plan, which was 
elaborated by the Commission in the framework of the ENP and implemented – after an 
initial reluctance by the Moldovan government, which preferred to be part of the EU’s 
South Eastern European policy – by the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council on 22 
February 2005.22 
The EU Council’s reaction to the increased importance of Moldova and the Transnistria 
conflict in Commission documents has been rather cautious. From a strategic point of 
view, the most problematic issue seems to be the failure to mention even once Moldova 
or the Transnistrian conflict in the European Security Strategy. It was only in June 2004 – 
in the aftermath of the Commission’s first ENP Strategy Paper and Moldova Country 
Paper – that the Council began to strengthen its own position on Moldova and the 
                                                 
19 See N. Popescu, The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood (Occasional Paper 60, 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2005), pp. 9-13. 
20 See European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006/National Indicative Programme 2002-
2003 Moldova, 27 December 2001; and European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2002-
2006/National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 Moldova, undated. 
21 Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006/National Indicative Programme 2002-2003, note 20 above, p. 7. 
22 See European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report: Moldova SEC(2004) 567, 
Brussels, 12 May 2004; and EU-Moldova Action Plan, undated. 
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Transnistria issue by publishing its first conclusions on Moldova. The Council states 
‘...that solving the conflict in Transnistria is key to making further progress towards 
building a strong and stable Moldova’. Furthermore, the Council clearly identifies the 
central security issues associated with the Transnistria conflict, in particular the fight 
against trafficking and the proliferation of weapons, the need to control effectively 
Moldova’s borders, especially with Ukraine, and the withdrawal of Russian forces and 
military equipment.23 Thus, the Council conclusions on Moldova form certainly the 
Council’s principal strategic publication in relation with the Transnistrian conflict. The 
way they address the security issues in Moldova further indicates that once more the EU 
interprets them in terms of absolute gains, i.e. dealing with them increases the security of 
both Moldova and the EU, and may, thus, qualify as a security provider. 
In sum, the launch of the new neighbourhood policy after 2002 has seen a much more 
intensive examination of the Transnistrian conflict and the related security issues by the 
EU, in particular by the European Commission. The majority of documents identify the 
Transnistrian conflict and the other associated security matters as key problems and 
major issues for both Moldova and the EU. This indicates that after 2002 the EU might 
have been turning into a security provider in Moldova. But in order to confirm this, it is 
necessary to analyse first the concrete actions the EU has carried out as conflict 
management measures in Moldova. 
 
 
IV EU Conflict Management in Moldova 
 
The European Commission has been active in Moldova since its independence in 1991. 
Its activity has consisted basically of Community assistance – totalling between 1991 and 
2003 €253.3 million – which has been distributed according to the overall priorities of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Country Strategy Paper. In general, the 
Community assistance, though not always as effective as planned, may have had positive 
effects on the political, social and economic development of Moldova. In fact, the overall 
situation of Moldova has improved in recent years. However, until 2001/2002 the 
Commission has not addressed directly security issues in Moldova/Transnistria. As was 
suggested by the absence of security issues in pre-2001 documents on Moldova, the EU 
in general acted rather as a passive security consumer, which means, in this particular 
case, that it did not act in the face of a dismal security situation in Moldova. It entrusted 
Moldova’s security to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
Russia and other international mediators and focused its efforts on the area, where it saw 
its own security directly affected: the Balkans. It was only after 2002, when the major 
Balkan wars had ended and the unresolved conflicts in the EU’s new post-enlargement 
neighbourhood loomed at the horizon that the EU has been emerging as a security 
provider in Moldova. Especially the prospect of the adhesion of Romania was a wake-up 
call for EU policy makers: On the one hand, thousands of Moldovans, who possess 
double Romanian and Moldovan nationality, have become EU citizens. It is estimated 
that between 1991 and 2002 between 80,000 and 93,000 Moldovans have obtained 
                                                 
23 General Affairs Council, ‘Moldova – Council Conclusions’ 2590th Council Meeting 10189/04 (Presse 
195), Luxembourg, 14 June 2004, pp. 14-15. 
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Romanian passports, though this figure has dropped to roughly 3,000 in recent years.24 At 
the same time, Romania has introduced only very reluctantly an increasingly strict border 
regime with Moldova in order to comply with Schengen requirements. It was only on its 
day of entry into the EU that it required for the first time visas for Moldovans travelling 
to Romania. Yet, in the wake of Romania’s stricter border regime, up to 800,000 
Moldovans, i.e. since September 2006 about 6,000 a day, have applied for Romanian 
passports. Although it is still not clear how Romania will deal with this issue in the 
future, the possibility exists that paradoxically a large part of Moldovans become EU 
citizens without Moldova joining the EU.25 On the other hand, Romania’s entry in the EU 
in 2007 has finally turned the Romania-Moldova border into an EU-Moldova border. The 
EU has, therefore, realized that conflict management in Transnistria may not be only in 
the interest of Moldova but affects mutually Moldovan and European interests. 
Consequently, both the Commission and the Council have substantially intensified their 
activities and have directly addressed concrete security issues. 
 
 
1. European Commission Activities 
 
In recent years, the Commission has focused its security-related activities on four areas: 
First of all, it has strongly supported the central Moldovan government in border and 
customs affairs. It focused its activity, in particular, on the improvement of the border 
and customs relations between Moldova and Ukraine and in May 2003 Moldova and 
Ukraine actually signed a common agreement, in which Ukraine recognized Moldova’s 
new custom stamps and seals, which had been introduced in 2001. The overall aim of 
these custom and border measures is to lower the ‘vested interests’ in the status quo of 
the Transnistria conflict of organized crime, shadowy businessmen and corrupt 
politicians. As these ‘vested interests’ are mainly related to smuggling, trafficking and 
other illegal activities, an effective custom and border regime can actually have a 
profound long-term impact. 
These efforts were further boosted on 7 October 2005, when the European Commission, 
Moldova and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding for an EU Border 
Assistance Mission (BAM) along the Moldova-Ukraine border, including the 
Transnistrian section. The mission’s task is basically two-fold: On the one hand, it trains 
and advises Moldovan and Ukrainian custom and border officials in order to improve 
their border management skills. On the other hand, mobile teams of EU border guards are 
active themselves along the border, mainly by making unannounced visits to border 
check-points. The mission has, however, no executive powers. The mission, which 
started on 1 December 2005, will run initially for two years, for which the Commission 
has earmarked in total €20 million through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the 
TACIS programme. The Commission has fought hard inter-institutional trench wars to 
                                                 
24 See The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, ‘Heading for the Exit’ [30 January 2007] The 
Economist, available at: <http://www.economist.com>; and G. Dura, EU Membership Gives Romania New 
Opportunities in its Relations with Moldova (Centre for European Policy Studies, 31 January 2007), 
available at: <http://www.ceps.be>. 
25 Considering that Moldova (without Transnistria) has a population of 3.2 million, of which 600,000 
already live abroad, 800,000 is a large number. However, Romania is able to process currently only 20,000 
citizenship applications a year.  
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convert it in a pure communitarian mission without Council influence.26 It has even 
financed initially the mission through the Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism – 
from a practical point of view a rather weird decision, as this instrument is thought for 
short-term reactions to emergency situations. Yet finally, the Commission had to concede 
a double-hatted head of the EU BAM, who is also a special adviser to the Council’s 
newly appointed Special Representative and the head of a team of three advisors of the 
Special Representative on border related issues.27 
Apart from the effectiveness and coherence of the EU mission itself, another external 
factor is crucial for the successful implementation of the BAM: Ukraine. After all, most 
of the border control at the Transnistrian section of the Ukraine-Moldova border has to be 
done by Ukrainian officials. However, the volatile political situation in Ukraine in the 
aftermath of the Orange Revolution casts doubt on Ukraine’s commitment, since a tight 
border regime at the Ukraine-Transnistria border does not only affect interests in 
Transnistria but also strong local interests in Ukraine. Without a resolute pro-European 
leader in Kiev, who realizes that an effective border regime is indeed a pre-requisite for 
further integration with the EU, Ukrainian collaboration is, therefore, far from assured. 
Recent developments, however, are promising: On 30 December 2005, for example, the 
Moldovan and Ukrainian Prime Ministers signed the crucial Joint Declaration, which 
requires official Moldovan stamps for all Transnistrian goods exported to and via 
Ukraine. Even after Victor Yanukovych became Prime Minister in August 2006, Ukraine 
has supported the EU BAM: In November 2006, Ukraine and Moldova signed under the 
auspices of the Commission a border cooperation agreement, which improves the 
exchange of information relevant for effective border controls.28 
However, after its first year of operation, overall results of the BAM have been still 
mixed. Whereas the Commission and, surprisingly, the European Parliament hail the 
success of the mission, independent observers have been more critical.29 On the one hand, 
the EU BAM and the new border regime along the Transnistria-Ukraine border have 
forced at least some Transnistrian companies to register with the Moldovan government, 
thus strengthening Moldova’s authority in Transnistria. Yet, on the other hand, these 
advances have been largely outdone by Russia’s policy towards Moldova in 2006. First, 
it imposed on Moldova higher prices for gas and later it imposed an embargo on wine, 
Moldova’s main export product. Although these measures were not directly related to the 
EU BAM, they weakened significantly Moldova’s economy and demonstrated Russia’s 
enormous leverage in comparison with the EU.30 Furthermore, although the mission has 
been successful in detecting cases of smuggling of personal goods such as cigarettes and 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, the EU BAM’s website can be found on the Council’s website for ESDP missions: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu>. The Commission used for a long time EC BAM instead of EU BAM. 
Most notably, the Memorandum of Understanding refers explicitly to the European Commission Border 
Assistance Mission. 
27 See Council of the European Union, Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the 
Main Aspects and Basic Choices of CFSP 10314/06, Brussels, 08 June 2006, p. 69. 
28 See European Commission, ENP at Work: Ukraine and Moldova to Strengthen Border Cooperation 
IP/06/1592, Brussels, 21 November 2006; and Council of the European Union, EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint 
Press Statement 14604/06 (Presse 297), Helsinki, 27 October 2006. 
29 See O. Protsyk, ‘Moldova’s Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria’ (2006) 53 
Problems of Post-Communism, p. 35. 
30 Moldova tried to counter (largely unsuccessfully) Russia’s policy by vetoing its entry in the World Trade 
Organization. 
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food, more serious forms of trafficking such as of weapons or human beings have not 
been uncovered. Either criminal cross border activity has been significantly smaller than 
expected or the currently 101-person strong BAM has been simply too small to detect 
serious smuggling and trafficking along a 1,222 km long border. 
The second field of activity of the Commission in relation with the Transnistria conflict 
concerns political advice, in particular in the form of an EU expert, who participated in 
the so-called Joint Constitutional Commission. This Commission was established by the 
Moldovan President in February 2003 in order to draw up under international supervision 
a new common Moldovan Constitution. However, the Commission, which consisted of 
Moldovan and Transnistrian experts as well as observers from Russia, Ukraine, the 
OSCE, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe31 and the EU, got rapidly stuck 
in quarrels between the Transnistrian and Moldovan side and is virtually dead today. 
Nevertheless, it has been the first direct EU involvement in negotiations to reach a 
conflict settlement in Transnistria.32 The third field of activity refers to the import into the 
EU of certain steel products from Moldova. More concretely, the Commission and 
Moldova agreed on 29 October 2004 that the Community’s competent authorities would 
grant import licenses to certain Moldovan steel products only if they had received 
previously a special export license issued by the central Moldovan authorities. Since 
Moldova’s steel production is concentrated in its breakaway region Transnistria, this 
‘double-check-system’ has the potential to weaken the economic base that sustains 
Transnistria’s quasi-independence and to force Transnistrian steel producers to 
collaborate with the central Moldovan authorities. The fourth field of activity can be 
described as intensified bilateral relations between the Commission and Moldova, 
symbolized by the long-awaited opening of an own Commission Delegation in Chisinau 
on 6 October 2005.  
 
 
2. Actions in the Framework of CFSP 
 
Until 2002 CFSP actions were limited to the annual EU-Moldova Cooperation Council 
Meetings, both at ministerial and senior official levels, and to two Troika visits at senior 
official level to Moldova, the first one in October 1999 and the second one in December 
2000. However, both Troika trips remained without concrete results. As figure 1 shows, it 
were the years 2001/2002 that brought about a significant quantitative intensification of 
CFSP actions in Moldova. In fact, since 2001/2002 the number of CFSP actions has 
increased steadily. Between 2002 and 2005 the number of CFSP actions was almost 
triplicated. This – at least quantitatively – intensified activity in Moldova coincides with 
the development of a more explicit European conflict management policy towards 
Moldova in the framework of the ENP. Thus, it demonstrates that with the development 
of ENP and with the clear incorporation of Moldova into this policy, CFSP actions have 
increased. It is possible to discern, therefore, a direct link between the development of a 
                                                 
31 Officially called the European Commission for Democracy through Law, the Venice Commission is an 
advisory body of the Council of Europe on constitutional matters. See <http://www.venice.coe.int/>. 
32 See M. Vahl, The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict (CEPS Policy Brief 73, Centre for 
European Policy Studies 2005), p. 2. 
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new European policy – the ENP – and the intensification of an existing one – the CFSP. 
But which CFSP actions have actually been applied in Moldova? 
 
Figure 1. Application of CFSP Instruments* in Moldova, 1998-2005 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1998
1999
2000
2001**
2002
2003***
2004****
2005
1 - Political dialogue at ministerial level
2 - Political dialogue at senior official level
3 - Declarations
4 - Demarches
5 - Legal Acts
 
 
* CFSP Instruments follow the categories used by the Council in its Annual Reports on CFSP to the 
Parliament (excluding Reports of Heads of Mission of EU Member States). 
** Includes one Demarche addressing Ukraine. 
*** Includes one Demarche addressing Russia. 
**** Includes one Demarche addressing Russia. 
 
Source: Own elaboration from EU documents published by the Council of the European Union. 
 
Political dialogue and diplomacy has been the most active field of CFSP in Moldova and 
as table 1 shows, the EU has used virtually all instruments available in this area. The 
oldest and most constant form of political dialogue has been certainly the institutionalized 
meetings of the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council, which has met in recent years at least 
once a year at ministerial level. Although these meetings have undoubtedly smoothed 
EU-Moldova relations, their potential to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict has been low. So from 2001/2002 on, the Cooperation Council 
meetings have been complemented by other forms of political dialogue and diplomacy, 
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most notably declarations and demarches, interventions by Javier Solana and the 
appointment of a Special Representative to Moldova. 
 
Table 1: The Use of CFSP Instruments in Moldova 
 
CFSP Instruments 
(low intensity) 
Political Dialogue and Diplomacy Diplomatic Missions 
Dialogue 
meetings 
Declarations Demarches 
Special 
Representatives 
Observation and fact-
finding missions 
Monitoring 
missions 
Applied in Moldova:       
 
CFSP Instruments 
(middle intensity) 
Sanctions 
Diplomatic 
sanctions 
Commercial and 
economic sanctions 
Sanctions on capital 
movements and payments 
Arms embargoes 
Applied in Moldova:     
 
CFSP Instruments 
(high intensity) 
Crisis Mechanisms 
Civil police 
force 
Rule of law 
mission 
Civilian administration 
mission 
Civil protection 
Military 
deployment 
Applied in Moldova:     Discussed in 2003 
 
Source: Own elaboration from EU documents; CFSP instrument types based on D. Miralles Solé, An 
Instrumental Analysis of the European Union’s Capability to Act in Conflict Response (Working Paper 42, 
Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus 2004), pp. 41-64.33 
 
The Council/Presidency declarations on Moldova have focused on the numerous issues 
involved in the Transnistrian conflict. The latest declaration, for example, condemns the 
referendum in Transnistria of 17 September 2006 on independence and possible 
unification with Russia as undemocratic – a move that was strongly supported by a 
resolution of the European Parliament. Javier Solana, for his part, has been conducting 
‘phone call diplomacy’, i.e. he has phoned several times with Moldovan leaders in order 
to discuss affairs related with the Transnistrian conflict. The arguably ‘...most dramatic 
instance of EU involvement...’34 in this regard has been Javier Solana’s phone call to the 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, in which he urged him not to sign the Russia-
backed Kozak-Memorandum.35 Apart from this ‘phone call diplomacy’, Javier Solana has 
                                                 
33 We have broadly subdivided the instruments into low intensity, middle intensity and high intensity 
instruments. It must be emphasized that this categorization is not about effectiveness, i.e. high intensity 
does not imply more effectiveness than low intensity. Low intensity instruments such as declarations 
generally imply rather relatively low costs for the EU and/or its Member States, both financially and 
politically, since these measure lack normally a high degree of visibility, both inside the Union and outside. 
They are, therefore, a kind of ‘first resort’ instruments. On the contrary, high intensity instruments, for 
instance a military deployment abroad, include usually high financial costs and a high degree of visibility, 
both inside the Union (through the media) and on the ground in the recipient country. They have, 
consequently, strong political implications for the EU and its Member States and are normally used as ‘last 
resort’ instruments. Middle intensity tools can be found, obviously, in the middle of the continuum between 
low and high intensity instruments. 
34 M. Vahl, note 32 above, p. 2. 
35 In 2003, the Kremlin tried to by-pass its co-mediators in the Moldova conflict, the OSCE and Ukraine, 
and negotiated in secret talks with Moldova and Transnistria the so-called Kozak Memorandum. This 
Memorandum, however, did not guarantee the territorial integrity of Moldova and fixed, moreover, the 
long-term presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. 
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also met the Moldovan President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister personally 
in Brussels. The High Representative, however, has never visited Moldova.36 Though he 
has admittedly a very tight timetable, this is a clear sign that Moldova and the 
Transnistrian conflict are still not a top EU priority.  
The Special Representative – a frequent demand by experts37 – was appointed in March 
2005, when the Council recognized that ‘[t]here is a need to ensure coordination and 
consistency of external actions of the EU in Moldova’.38 His principal mandate is to 
contribute to the various EU policy goals in Moldova, notably also on the basis of the 
ENP Action Plan. Since October 2005, he also represents the EU as observer, together 
with the United States, in the five-sided talks between Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, 
Ukraine and the OSCE. The Special Representative’s original mandate has been extended 
and amended four times and is currently in force until 29 February 2008. The Council 
appointed for the post first Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, a Dutch career diplomat, and in 
February 2007, Kálmán Mizsei, a former Assistant Secretary General of the United 
Nations from Hungary. Their appointments show that the Council had the intention to 
strengthen its position in Moldova with highly-qualified, Russian-speaking Special 
Representatives. Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, the former Personal Representative of the 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Moldova, had also an in-depth knowledge of the conflict 
and important links with the OSCE, which is still today a key player in the conflict 
management process in Moldova/Transnistria. 
In short, the EU has already progressed significantly in the area of political dialogue and 
diplomacy and has applied most instruments available in this field (see table 1). 
However, the EU has been very reluctant to use more forceful policy instruments at its 
disposal, in particular sanctions and crisis mechanisms (see table 1). In other words, the 
EU’s CFSP activities are almost exclusively low-intensity political dialogue and 
diplomacy actions, which require relatively low material and financial commitments and 
entail low political costs. In February 2003, the EU made its most (and only) drastic 
intervention in the Transnistrian conflict until then, when it identified the Transnistrian 
leadership as the principal obstacle to a negotiated conflict settlement. Consequently, it 
imposed a travel ban on ‘...those members of the Transnistrian leadership considered to 
be primarily responsible for the lack of cooperation to promote a political settlement of 
the conflict’.39 The sanctions have been extended and expanded eight times and are 
currently still in force until 27 February 2008.40 However, as the obstruction of the 
conflict settlement process by the Transnistrian leadership has continued, the EU could 
have taken into consideration more intensive sanctions such as the freezing of foreign 
bank accounts belonging to Transnistrian leaders.41 Yet, it has been so far very reluctant 
to introduce them. Likewise, up to the present day, the EU has not implemented any of its 
                                                 
36 He participated only in the launching ceremony of the EU BAM in Odessa, Ukraine.  
37 See D. Lynch, ‘The Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2005) 40 International 
Spectator, pp. 37-38. 
38 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 Appointing a 
Special Representative of the European Union for Moldova OJ L81/50-52, 30 March 2005. 
39 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2003/139/CFSP of 27 February 2003 
Concerning Restrictive Measures against the Leadership of the Transnistrian Region of the Moldovan 
Republic OJ L53/60-61, 28 February 2003. 
40 The corresponding Common Positions are available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>. 
41 See Moldova: No Quick Fix, note 18 above, p. 26; and N. Popescu, note 19 above, p. 33. 
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numerous high-intensity crisis mechanism instruments available in the framework of 
CFSP (see table 1), though the EU considered seriously a proposal by the Dutch OSCE 
Presidency to send an EU peacekeeping force of 600 to 1000 soldiers to Transnistria by 
the end of 2003.42 This EU military mission would have been the first on the territory of a 
former Soviet Republic and would have substituted the largely ineffective peacekeeping 
format of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan forces that has been in place since the 
1992 ceasefire agreement.43 Yet finally, the EU Member States could not agree on a 
common standpoint and the project was dismissed. 
In this regard, Russia stands out as the key factor. There exist influential groups in the 
Kremlin that see Transnistria as a strategically important region for Russia, a piece of its 
own ‘near abroad’ or its main zone of influence. Russia is, therefore, eager – for strategic 
and prestige reasons – not to permit other actors, e.g. the EU, to become too influential in 
its ‘near abroad’. An absolute taboo topic for Russia is in particular the possibility of non-
Russian military involvement in the region. Consequently, as Bretherton et al. point out, 
‘[t]he military instruments of the ESDP would never be deployed in these areas without 
the support and collaboration of Russia’.44 In other words, in the case of Moldova, the 
postmodern EU meets a traditional power, which acts according to the classical logic of 
realpolitik. Moreover, due to a changed domestic and international environment, Russian 
foreign policy in general has become in recent years much more self-confident than in the 
years before. Consequently, this has led to growing pro-active policies in its 
neighbourhood with the aim to increase its dominance in the region. A major pillar of 
these policies is the support for secessionist entities such as Transnistria and the refusal to 
change the status quo by contributing actively to sustainable conflict settlements – at least 
as long as conflict settlements do not serve Russian interests.45 In the case of the 
Transnistrian conflict, Russia is currently trying to sideline completeley the EU (and the 
United States) by negotiating with Moldova a secret deal based on Russian interests in 
the region.46 So far, the EU’s reaction has lacked the vigor of an earlier response to a 
similar move by Russia four years ago.47 This reflects the broader picture of EU-Russia 
relations in the case of the Transnistria conflict: The EU discusses the Transnistria issue 
with Russia in the framework of the Common Space of External Security during bilateral 
fora such as the EU-Russia summits, but there are no signs that it actually puts pressure 
on Russia to solve the conflict in a cooperative way. Apparently the big (and old) 
Member States, in particular France, Great Britain and Germany, are not willing to 
challenge Russia in the case of the Transnistria conflict.48 Other interests, especially 
energy security, seem to be more important in the relation with Russia.49 In this respect, it 
                                                 
42 See J. Dempsey, ‘European Union Intervention: Troops May Play Peacekeeping Role in Moldova’ [11 
July 2003] Financial Times, p. 7. 
43 See D. Lynch, Russia Faces Europe (Chaillot Papers 60, Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2003), p. 98. 
44 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (2nd edn, Routledge, London 2006), 
p. 210. 
45 See N. Popescu, ‘Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entibies in Georgia and 
Moldova (CEPS Policy Brief 109, Centre for European Policy Studies 2006). 
46 See ‘Europe: A Thaw in the River, [21 April 2007] The Economist, p. 39; and A. Rettman, ‘EU Tries to 
Reassert Role in Future of Moldova’ [25 May 2007] Euobserver, available at: <http://euobserver.com>. 
47 See footnote 35. 
48 See Interview, Brussels, 20 June 2006. 
49 In 2005, the largest share of crude oil (36.4 %) and gas imports (36.7 %) into the EU came from the 
former Soviet Union and Russia respectively. See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy 
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is important to highlight that the Kremlin uses its energy resources as a powerful foreign 
policy tool to accomplish its aims.50 The EU and its Member States, for their part, have 
increasingly demonstrated that they are willing to play by Russia’s rules of power politics 
and have failed to pursue vigorously its conflict management policies out of fear of 
upsetting Russia and, thus, putting in danger Russian energy supplies to Europe. In short, 
they have begun to subordinate their interests in sustainable conflict resolution in 
Moldova to their interest in maintaining secure energy flows from Russia. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, two clear phases are discernable in the EU’s conflict management policy 
in Moldova. The first one, lasting from the short Moldovan civil war in 1992 until 2002, 
is characterized by the EU acting as a passive security consumer. Until 2002, neither the 
European Commission nor the Council carried out any meaningful security-related tasks 
that might have had an impact on conflict resolution in Transnistria. The situation 
changed only in 2002, when the EU began to adopt the role of a security provider in the 
wake of the new neighbourhood policy. Since then, the Transnistria conflict has become 
an important, though not dominant part of EU-Moldova relations. Moreover, the EU has 
emphasized that conflict management and the solution of the various security problems 
such as the flourishing of criminal networks are in the interest of both Moldova and the 
EU. In other words, the EU’s principal motivations have not been its own security 
interests, but a possible win-win outcome for both Moldova and the EU. At the same 
time, the EU has intensified its conflict management efforts in Moldova. In this regard 
stands out the Commission’s BAM, which has helped to control the Transnistrian section 
of the Moldova-Ukraine border since December 2005. Furthermore, the Council has 
increasingly applied CFSP instruments in relation with the Transnistria conflict. In short, 
the EU has become an emerging security provider. 
However, most of the EU’s instruments have been ‘low-intensity’ measures in the area of 
political dialogue and diplomacy such as declarations, because the larger Member States 
have not been prepared to challenge Russian interests in its ‘near abroad’. Consequently, 
the EU has become an emerging, but due to the Russian factor still very reluctant security 
provider in the case of conflict management in Moldova. In this respect, Moldova is a 
paradigmatic case for the tension between the EU’s security provider and security 
consumer approaches. Whereas in recent years the EU’s security provider approach 
towards conflict management in Transnistria has been intensified, the EU’s security 
consumer approach regarding secure energy flows from Russia has prevented a more 
forceful security provider approach towards conflict management in Moldova and even 
opens up the possibility that it completely eclipses the EU’s conflict management efforts. 
Romanian EU membership in 2007 and the obligatory re-negotiation of the EU-Moldova 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2008 may give EU policies on the 
Transnistria conflict a new and possibly decisive impulse. Although in recent years 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Transport, European Union: Energy and Transport in Figures 2006: Part 2: Energy, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport>. 
50 See A. Rahr, ‘The New OPEC: How Russia Aims to Become a Global Energy Power’ (2006) 7 
Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition, pp. 69-76. 
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relations between Romania and Moldova have not been smooth all the time, Romania, 
Moldova’s only neighbouring EU Member State, has shown a strong interest in pushing 
for a stronger EU involvement in Moldova.51 However, EU conflict management in 
Transnistria has not been a top priority of its policy regarding Moldova and it is not clear 
which kind of leverage Romania could offer. After all, Russia is an enormously strong 
factor that casts doubts on the actual practicability of any stronger EU engagement in 
Transnistria. In fact, due to the EU’s energy security interests, Russia might be successful 
in pressuring the EU into playing by the rules of traditional power politics and reducing 
its expectations about transformation and sustainable conflict settlement in favour of the 
current status quo. It is, thus, likely that at the end of the day the EU turns once more into 
a security consumer. This would show that a postmodern EU may change a specific 
foreign policy approach if it is confronted with a determined traditional power such as 
Russia. The most pressing question for the EU is, therefore, not how to manage the 
Transnistria conflict per se – which is by itself already a challenge due to the Union’s 
lack of experience in this field – but how to deal with Russia in the conflict management 
process. 
                                                 
51 See Romania’s Position Document UE-RO 1806/06, 12th EU-Romania Association Council, Brussels, 
20 March 2006. 
